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Critical theory can be understood as a body of theories and research programs which aim to
transform social systems, so as to alleviate the oppression to which agents might be subjected within those
systems. This task has led many theorists to use some version of the notion of “ideology”, understood very
broadly as systems of beliefs and/or practices that make agents participate in patterns of unjust oppression.
Ideology is a multi-faceted concept, and the word “ideology” has been used to refer to many
different things across very different theories, for very different purposes. But some common themes are
typically shared across different interpretations of the term. In particular, ideology, when used in a
pejorative sense, is often described as necessarily involving some kind of falsity or illusion. My goal in this
paper is to assess the relevance of this idea to ideology critique. Are all ideological beliefs necessarily
false? To what extent should ideology critique focus on the falsity of such beliefs?
I argue that we must be careful when making the assumption that ideology is by essence “false” or
“illusory”. In particular, it should not be taken to mean that criticizing ideological beliefs must necessarily
require focusing on their truth-values or epistemic properties. A belief φ that is neither false nor
epistemically flawed might nevertheless have the “ideological function” of making agents accept an
oppressive system S. Beliefs of this kind, I argue, should be the target of functional ideology critique, but
cannot be effectively subjected to any kind of epistemic critique. When this occurs, φ does not play its
ideological role in virtue of being itself false or unwarranted, but in virtue of being the object of a false
higher-order belief φ* of the form “the truth of φ makes S acceptable.” I argue that there is a legitimate
sense in which beliefs such as φ can be said to be “ideological”, although they are not “false”. But even if
we want to deny that such beliefs are ideological stricto sensu, we must at the very least recognise their
relevance to ideology critique.
In a first section, I describe the theoretical background on which my arguments are based. In a
second section, I explain the sense in which the assumption that ideology must be “false” has to be
nuanced: many beliefs that are not false or “illusory” in any plausible, non-metaphorical sense nevertheless
contribute to oppressive systems by making them appear acceptable. This observation, I argue in the last
section, suggests that the ideology critique of beliefs must go beyond the mere epistemic dimension, and
that the critique of practices and norms cannot be based on epistemological considerations alone.

Section 1 – Ideology
A) Forms of consciousness
The term “ideology” has historically been used in a number of different senses: sometimes
neutrally, sometimes pejoratively, sometimes positively (Larraín 1979, Introduction). I am interested here
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mostly in “ideology” in its pejorative sense.
Raymond Geuss (1981) provides a useful framework for thinking about the concept of ideology.
He first provides an account of ideology in a normatively neutral, descriptive sense. An ideology
(descriptive sense) should be understood as a form of consciousness, that is, “a particular constellation of
beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, etc.” that the members of a group hold (ibid. 12). But what does
“constellation” mean here? This set of beliefs, attitudes, etc., Geuss explains, are “systematically
interconnected.” The minimal assumption we can make about this “systematic interconnection” is that the
elements of a form of consciousness are related – at the very least – in the sense that they support each
other to various degrees. For example, religious sentiment reinforces the acceptance of certain religious
rituals, these rituals reinforce the authority of the Church, etc. The nature of the relation between these
different elements (belief in God, religious practices, religious institutions) might be analysed as a causal
one, in the sense that the existence of a certain element is a (more or less important) part of what makes
other elements possible.

B) Competing approaches to ideology and ideology critique
What makes a form of consciousness an ideology in the pejorative sense, then? Geuss (1981, 13)
usefully identifies three different ways in which this question has been answered by different theories of
ideology. Let us consider them in turn.
1. A form of consciousness can be an ideology 1 in virtue of some epistemic properties of the beliefs
that are its constituents, i.e. properties related to epistemic warrant, truth, etc.
2. A form of consciousness can be an ideology in virtue of its functional properties, i.e., properties
that have to do with the effects that a certain form of consciousness has. (Does the form of
consciousness in question contribute to oppression, domination, injustice, etc.?)
3. A form of consciousness can be an ideology in virtue of its genetic properties, i.e. properties that
have to do with its origin. (Does the form of consciousness have an origin which makes it worthy
of being rejected?)
I call these three different ways of conceiving of ideology the epistemic, functional, and genetic
approaches to ideology respectively. Now, it should be noted that the way in which I present these three
approaches differs significantly from Geuss’s account, to the degree that Geuss interprets the question,
(a) What makes a form of consciousness an ideology (in the pejorative sense)?
as equivalent to the question,
(b) What does it mean to say that a form of consciousness is “false”/an “illusion”?
Since I do not want to assume that ideology is necessarily “false” or an “illusion”, I reject the assumption
that (a) and (b) must be equivalent. Nevertheless, Geuss’s typology is useful as it highlights the different
1 In what follows “ideology” – without further indication – should always be interpreted as meaning “ideology
in the pejorative sense.”
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ways in which critical theorists often present/criticise particular forms of consciousness and their elements.
In accordance with the three dimensions along which a form of consciousness can be an ideology
in the pejorative sense, ideology critique can take an epistemic, functional, or genetic form. Cordelia Fine’s
critique of “neurosexism”, for instance, is above all epistemic, as it is based on a series of arguments
showing that certain claims about sex differences are not warranted by scientific evidence (see for example
Fine 2010, part 2). This type of critique can be contrasted with, for example, many of the arguments that
McKinnon raises against pornography (1994). Pornography, MacKinnon argues, should not be analysed as
a discursive item but rather as a practice which is harmful to women. This critique is a functional one, as it
focuses on the effects of a certain practice.
An interesting question to ask is whether these different ways of conceiving of ideology – and the
different forms that ideology critique can take – can be shown to be related in some way. Shelby (2003),
for example, argues that whether a form of consciousness is ideological depends at the same time on
epistemic, functional and genetic factors (Shelby 2003, 183-184). Now, what I want to argue is that there is
a substantial degree of independence between epistemic ideological properties and functional ideological
properties – so it might seem that accounts such as Shelby’s, which try to show that these two types of
properties are interdependent, threaten the claim defended in this essay.
So it is worth clarifying this point at the outset. I do not take issue with the claim (made by Shelby
and others) that the functional and epistemic properties of forms of consciousness are interconnected. What
I argue is that, at the level of individual beliefs, these two types of property can come apart. I introduce this
question more fully in what follows.

C) “General” accounts of ideology
Let us call a “general account” of ideology a theory of ideology which tries to make sense of the
different forms that ideology critique can take in different contexts, and of the different properties which
have traditionally been associated with the concept of ideology. These theories often either assume that
ideological belief systems must be false or assume that the functional properties of an ideological form of
consciousness must essentially be a result of their falsity. Jorge Larraín for example summarizes Marx’s
conception of ideology in the following way:
[Ideology] has a particular specific connotation whose two specific and connected features
are, firstly, that it conceals social contradictions and, secondly, that it does it in the interests
of the dominant class. (Larraín 1979, 48)
Sally Haslanger similarly claims that:
Very broadly, ideology is best understood functionally: ideology functions to stabilize or
perpetuate unjust power and domination, and does so through some form of masking or
illusion. (Haslanger 2017, 150)
Finally, we must consider Tommie Shelby’s ingenious attempt to define ideology in a way which shows a
systematic link between the epistemic, functional, and genetic dimensions identified by Geuss. His account
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has the following form:
A form of social consciousness is an ideology if and only if
(i) its discursive content is epistemically defective, that is, distorted by illusions;
(ii) through these illusions it functions to establish or reinforce social relations of oppression;
and
(iii) its wide acceptance can be (largely) explained by the class-structured false consciousness
of most who embrace it. (Shelby 2003, 183-184)
What these different general definitions of ideology have in common are the assumptions that ideology has
a certain function, namely, reinforcing relations of oppression/domination; that ideology must involve false
or unwarranted beliefs (“concealment”, “masking or illusion”); finally, that ideology has the function that
it has in virtue of involving epistemically defective beliefs. Hence, all of these accounts point out the
important fact that the functional and epistemic properties of ideological forms of consciousness are
intertwined. However, these general accounts of ideology leave it unclear whether the functional and
epistemic properties of forms of consciousness are also connected at the level of ideological beliefs. This
gives rise to the hypothesis that is the focus of this essay: do beliefs that have ideological functional
properties also have epistemically problematic properties? Is the ideological function of beliefs a result of
their epistemic properties?

Section 2 – The limits of the epistemic approach in regard to ideological beliefs
A) Epistemically problematic beliefs
Many accounts of ideology assume that ideology must be essentially “false” or an “illusion” in
some way but these accounts are not always clear about the sense in which ideological beliefs are supposed
to be “false” or “illusory”. In what follows I will try to determine what this idea could plausibly amount to.
For this purpose, it is sensible to draw a distinction between (1) beliefs that are false, (2) beliefs that are
“epistemically defective/unwarranted”, (3) beliefs that are illusory, and (4) beliefs that are the consequence
of illusions.
(1) I understand “false belief” in a standard way. If I believe that p is the case, then my belief is
false iff the proposition “p” – which says that p is the case – is false (it “fails to correspond to reality,” let’s
say). I assume that it is possible for someone to have unconscious beliefs, i.e. to believe that p without
being aware that they have such a belief. Many, if not most, ideological beliefs (e.g. “Racist discrimination
is uncommon”) are false in this standard way and can be held consciously or unconsciously by the agents
who have them.
(2) I understand “epistemically defective” as meaning the same as “epistemically unwarranted”.
My belief that p is epistemically unwarranted iff it is not justified, i.e. not warranted by the evidence that is
available to me. Many ideological beliefs are not demonstrably false but can be shown to be epistemically
defective in this way, e.g. “Men are naturally better leaders than women” – it may be difficult to disprove
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this claim for a number of reasons (the vagueness of the terms, the appeal to “nature”) but that does not
mean we would be justified in believing it.
(3) Let us say that an “illusion” is what G. A. Cohen – in his discussion of Marx – calls “a
discrepancy between reality and appearance.” So an illusion occurs “when and only when the explanation
of a state of affairs falsifies the description it is natural to give of it if one lacks the explanation” (Cohen
2000, 399). Here is a very brief outline of this idea. A state of affairs A can be “illusory” in the following
way: (i) It is “natural” to infer that a certain proposition p is true as a result of being exposed to that state of
affairs. In this case, p is the “natural description” of A. (ii) There is a correct explanation of A which shows
that the natural description p of A is actually false. If (i) and (ii) obtain, A is illusory because the correct
explanation of A shows that the natural description p of A is false. So an illusion occurs.
Let us say that my belief that p is illusory if p is the natural description of an illusory state of
affairs A. In that case, my belief that p is false because the correct explanation of A shows that p is false. If
I am given the correct explanation, I will cease to believe p. However, as long as I do not have access to
this correct explanation, I will continue to believe p. This belief, moreover, is epistemically justified
because it corresponds to what can be “naturally” inferred from A.
From a Marxist perspective for example the social form in which capitalism operates is an illusory
state of affairs because it is natural for people living under capitalism to infer that e.g. “Commodities
possess their value independently from labour.” But the correct (Marxist) analysis of this state of affairs
reveals that in fact commodities do not have value independently from labour (Marx 1976, 163-177). So
from this perspective, the belief that “Commodities possess their value independently from labour” is an
illusory ideological belief.
(4) A belief that is both true and justified is neither false nor epistemically defective and it cannot
be illusory. It is theoretically possible however that a true and justified belief could be the product of an
illusion in the sense of being itself (at least partly) justified by a belief that is illusory. So-called Gettier
cases are good examples of how this could occur.
Now I define an epistemically problematic belief as any belief that is either false, or unwarranted,
or illusory, or the product of an illusion. To provide an epistemic critique of a belief, let us say, is to show
that this belief is epistemically problematic in at least one of these four ways.
It should be clear from the examples given above that many – if not most – examples of
ideological beliefs are epistemically problematic. But of course, not every epistemically problematic belief
is also ideological: my false belief that “Wuhan is a province and not a city” can be the subject of
epistemic critique but that does not mean that this belief is ideological in any plausible sense.
What seems to mark the difference between my epistemically problematic belief that “Wuhan is a
province” and the epistemically problematic belief that e.g. “Everyone from Wuhan, or who is the same
race as those from Wuhan, is a carrier of disease” is that the latter might have the effect of reinforcing or
maintaining an oppressive system or practice; for example, it might contribute to racist discrimination
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against Asian people. So this latter belief seems to have an “ideological function” that the former lacks. It
is not only epistemically problematic but also functionally problematic, so to speak.
Now it is not clear whether having one particular set of functional properties must be necessary or
sufficient for a belief to count as “ideological” – the answer to this question depends on the account of
ideology we adopt. For my purposes all I need to show is that there can be some belief φ that is not
epistemically problematic but can be meaningfully called “ideological” in virtue of its functional
properties. This is the central claim of this essay, and the rest of the essay is geared towards its defence.

B) Are crop-tops cute? – the problem of social norms and shared values
Let us start by finding a belief that could be true, epistemically justified, but nevertheless
ideological in the sense of playing an ideological role in an oppressive system or practice. Judgments of
taste (e.g. artistic/aesthetic judgements, beauty and appearance norms, etc.) are good examples in that
regard (Chambers 2017, 187).2 Sally Haslanger (2007) for instance has convincingly argued that the truthvalue of a proposition such as
“Crop-tops are cute.”
should be assessed relative to the social milieu of the person, or group of people, who make the judgement
that crop-tops are cute. In other words, the criteria of assessment of the extension of “cute” are determined
by the existing norms in the milieu of the person (or group of people) making that judgement (Haslanger
2007, 72). Let us consider then a social milieu where patterns of interaction obtain that make the
proposition “Crop-tops are cute.” true.
Haslanger uses the example of a school where it is fashionable for 7 th-grade girls to wear croptops. Suppose one of these girls, D, judges that crop-tops are cute. If Haslanger’s analysis is correct, D’s
belief is true relative to her milieu, and probably justified. It is plausible to say that, in D’s milieu, “Croptops are cute” is not just a belief: it is a kind of important social knowledge (ibid., 73). Her belief is not
epistemically problematic properly speaking.
At the same time, Haslanger observes, there seems to be much to criticise about the opinion that
crop-tops are cute as it is held in D’s social milieu. Since the belief that crop-tops are cute is – we assume –
widely held among members of D’s school, it is part of a set of conditions that make crop-tops fashionable,
thus inciting 7th-grade girls to wear crop-tops. But this practice is itself worthy of criticism: “One might
argue, it would be better if seventh grade (roughly age 12) girls were wearing ordinary – midriff covering –
tops instead (because the crop-tops sexualize the girls who wear them, further marginalise the chubby girls,
etc.)” (ibid., 71-72). In other words, it seems that D’s judgement that crop-tops are cute could rightly be the
object of a functional critique because this belief helps maintain a social practice (the fashion of wearing
crop-tops) that reinforces problematic social patterns. Hence, the form of consciousness which
characterises fashion trends in D’s social milieu can rightfully be the target of ideology critique, in the
2 The idea that aesthetic judgments can have an ideological function has been forcefully defended by critical
theorists such as, for example, Pierre Bourdieu (1984, see for example 7).
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functional form, even though the beliefs it contains are not necessarily false and its oppressive properties
are not necessarily the result of false beliefs and illusions.
The general point to make here is that ideologies do not just proceed by making agents have false
or illusory beliefs about what is true or valuable but also by shaping what is true and valuable, so to speak
(Haslanger 2017, 162; see also Chambers 2017, 186-190). That is to say, the fact that agents in a social
group share an oppressive form of consciousness sometimes creates the conditions that make some beliefs
within that form of consciousness true and justified. As a result, certain beliefs that are epistemically
unproblematic can nevertheless play an essential role within systems of oppression, and should therefore
be criticised. But the kind of criticism which is at stake here cannot be a purely epistemic one.

Section 3 – Consequences for ideology critique
“Crop-top cases” such as the one discussed by Haslanger show that certain beliefs can motivate
oppressive practices which, at the same time, create the conditions that make those same beliefs true and
justified. Those beliefs cannot be criticised on epistemic grounds, and their oppressive character does not
depend on them being “illusions”. What are the conclusions that should be drawn from such cases in
regard to ideology critique?
I want to suggest that there are two main reasons why such beliefs are relevant to ideology critique
and can thus legitimately be called “ideological”. First, like other ideological beliefs, these beliefs exert an
oppressive ideological function: they support patterns of unjust oppression. Second, like other ideological
beliefs, these beliefs are embedded within ideological systems: they do not unilaterally reinforce other
beliefs/practices/attitudes within the form of consciousness they are part of; they are themselves reinforced
by the same beliefs, practices and attitudes they support.

A) Analysing the oppressive function of epistemically warranted beliefs
As I already suggested, we can distinguish two main forms that the ideology critique of beliefs can
take. The epistemic critique consists in showing that a certain belief is epistemically problematic. The
functional critique consists in showing that it has a certain oppressive function. General accounts of
ideology sometimes attempt to show that these two forms of critique are systematically connected. But
examples such as the one presented by Haslanger show how this idea can be misleading. Even if we accept
the claim that forms of consciousness play the ideological role that they do in virtue of containing
epistemically problematic beliefs, we should not conclude that every belief which plays a similar
oppressive function is false, or unjustified, or illusory, or the product of an illusion.
Perhaps we might object that in Haslanger’s example it is not the belief φ that “Crop-tops are
cute.” which has an oppressive function but a “higher-order belief” φ* that “Crop-tops are cute therefore it
is acceptable for 7th-grade girls to wear crop-tops.” In this way, we might try to argue that φ*, but not φ, is
really ideological. But this response seems ad hoc. Compare with the following pair of propositions, where
ψ is epistemically problematic:
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ψ: “There is no racism in our current society.”
ψ*: “ψ, therefore attempts to alleviate racism in our society are unjustified.”
It seems implausible to deny that ψ has the oppressive function of supporting racism. And there
seems to be no relevant difference between the pair ψ/ψ* and the pair φ/φ* which would justify the claim
that ψ has an oppressive function but φ does not. Therefore, this objection to the claim that certain beliefs
can be functionally problematic but epistemically unproblematic is unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, the comparison between φ/φ* and ψ/ψ* is illuminating in regard to the way in
which ideology critique should analyse the oppressive function of beliefs such as φ. In both cases, the firstorder belief φ/ψ supports an oppressive system S in virtue of being the object of a higher-order belief
φ*/ψ*. But only in the ψ/ψ* case is it possible to provide an epistemic critique of the higher-order belief by
providing an epistemic critique of the first-order belief. In the φ/φ* case, this is not possible, because φ is
not epistemically problematic strictly speaking.
Furthermore, we can note that if neither φ nor φ* were epistemically problematic, then we would
be justified in inferring that “It is acceptable for 7th-grade girls to wear crop-tops.” So, if we want to show
that φ really has the function of making an unacceptable system S appear acceptable (that is, if we want to
provide a functional critique of φ), we must be ready to show that φ* is epistemically problematic. Hence,
criticizing φ requires providing an epistemic critique of φ*, which consists in a moral critique of the claim
that the truth of φ makes S acceptable.

B) Analysing the self-supporting properties of epistemically warranted ideological beliefs
An ideology in our framework is a form of consciousness, that is, a system of inter-connected
practices, attitudes, and beliefs. It works as a system to the extent that the elements it contains mutually
support each other: racist beliefs not only reinforce racist practices but are also reinforced by the very same
practices they support. The other reason why beliefs such as φ should be called “ideological” is that, like
“traditional” (i.e. epistemically flawed) ideological beliefs, φ is systematically embedded within the form
of consciousness it supports.
To define this idea more precisely, let us say that a belief p is ideologically embedded in a form of
consciousness F iff:
(i) p supports a set of practices/attitudes in F.
(ii) F is oppressive (in which case F is an ideology in the pejorative sense defined in section 1).
(ii) p is itself supported by those same practices/attitudes.
Now, when we consider beliefs such as φ (“Crop-tops are cute”), we find that φ not only supports
certain practices – such as 7th-grade girls wearing crop-tops – but is itself supported by those same
practices to the extent that those practices create the conditions that make φ true and justified. So it follows
that φ satisfies (i)-(iii):
(i) φ supports the practice of 7th-grade girls wearing crop-tops.
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(ii) This practice is part of an oppressive form of consciousness that sexualizes young girls,
marginalizes the chubby girls, etc. (according to Haslanger).
(iii) φ is supported by the practice it motivates, since 7th-grade girls wearing crop-tops
makes the belief “Crop-tops are cute” true in their social milieu.
The fact that an epistemically grounded belief such as φ satisfies (i)-(iii) just as most beliefs that
are interesting targets for ideology critique satisfy (i)-(iii), gives us additional reason to think φ can
meaningfully be called “ideological”. The main difference lies in the fact that epistemically problematic
ideological beliefs usually satisfy (iii) by creating the conditions that make them appear reasonable or
justified, while a belief such as φ satisfies (iii) by creating the conditions that make it actually true,
justified, and epistemically unproblematic. This difference, however, arguably makes the latter an even
more interesting target for ideology critique. Indeed, while it seems possible to undermine an epistemically
problematic belief by merely providing an epistemic critique of it, the same cannot be said of φ since, as I
have argued, no such epistemic critique of it is available. Undermining belief in φ will thus require
transforming directly the practices that make it true and justified, rather than trying to demonstrate that it is
epistemically flawed.

Conclusion
There is an intuitive way of understanding ideology according to which ideology contributes to
oppression in virtue of being false. In this paper I have argued that this view must be nuanced. Some
beliefs can be called “ideological” in a meaningful sense, not by virtue of being false or epistemically
problematic, but in virtue of their functional properties. Let φ be such a belief. I conclude this essay by
highlighting some key conclusions about beliefs of this type.
First: φ fulfills its ideological function in virtue of being the object of a false/unwarranted higherorder belief φ* of the form “φ makes S acceptable” or “φ justifies S” (where S is an oppressive
practice/social system). Second: To provide a functional critique of φ, we must provide an epistemic
critique of the higher-order belief φ*, i.e. we must show that it is false or unwarranted. Third: to show that
φ* is “false”, we must provide a moral critique of the claim that φ justifies S. Fourth: undermining belief
in φ requires – in addition to such functional criticism – actually transforming the practices that render it
epistemically unproblematic.
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